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The largest single employer of  American youths is the United States 
military. While the proportion of  youths  serving in the military has 
declined continuously since the  1950s, still in  1972 approximately 9 
percent of white youths and 9 percent of black youths served in the 
military. We  have shown elsewhere that military hiring adds substan- 
tially to the total number of black youths employed, with an additional 
young black youth hired by the military increasing the total employment 
of black youths by  essentially one. Military hiring also seems to in- 
crease the total number of white youths who are employed, although 
the evidence is less sharp. Military hiring adds substantially to the total 
number of black youths employed, however, with an additional young 
black  man hired by the military increasing the total employment of 
black  youths by  essentially  one. Most youths who join the military 
leave after two or three years and join the civilian labor force. The 
relationship between military service and subsequent earnings of youths 
on civilian jobs is the subject of this chapter. 
There are at least two reasons why military service could enhance 
earnings on civilian jobs. Typically, work experience leads to higher 
wage rates, and military work experience may substitute for civilian 
work experience in this respect. In addition, military enlistees could 
receive special training that is transferable to the private sector and 
leads to higher wages there. Indeed, recruitment advertisements often 
emphasize the training that military enlistees receive and that this train- 
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ing will benefit the enlistee in  subsequent civilian employment. Ad- 
vertisements make clear reference to both the human capital investment 
and the certification that the military provides. Enlistees are trained in 
areas of their choice and often work with the latest in high-technology 
equipment. Moreover, commercials point out, civilian employers are 
sure to be impressed with the kind of person who can make it in  the 
military. 
Our analysis is based on the National Longitudinal Study of the High 
School Class of 1972 and subsequent follow-up surveys conducted in 
1973,1974,1976, and 1979. The survey collected a wide range of school, 
family background, family status, attitude, and aspiration information 
from approximately 23,000 high school seniors in 1972. The 1972 base 
survey drew a nationwide sample of high schools stratified in such a 
way that of  the approximately 1,300 schools selected, those in lower 
socioeconomic areas were somewhat oversampled. The follow-up sur- 
veys were used to obtain detailed information on later post-secondary- 
school choices and labor market experiences, among other things. 
The primary advantage of this data set is that it allows us to follow 
the same youths from high school graduation through possible military 
enlistment and ultimately to jobs in the civilian labor market. The data 
also provide information on measures of academic achievement and 
aptitude and on high school class rank. These measures of academic 
achievement or aptitude are typically unavailable in other data sources. 
A disadvantage of the data is the relatively  small sample of  persons 
who enter the military. In addition, the survey allows us to follow only 
high school graduates; approximately 30 percent of military enlistees 
do not have a high school degree (Cooper 1978). 
In section 6.1 we discuss descriptive data on the attributes of military 
enlistees versus other high school graduates. Contrary to common per- 
ceptions, we find that military enlistees are in academic achievement 
similar to non-enlistees who do not go from high school to a four-year 
college. The difference between enlistees and other high school grad- 
uates reflects the difference between high school graduates who attend 
four-year colleges and those who do not. Given that most enlistees are 
not college graduates, it seems fair to conclude that those who join the 
military are by common ability measures, very much like their peers 
who are potential enlistees but decide not to join. Consistent with the 
summary statistics, we also find that we are unable to provide a strong 
explanation of which youths among high school graduates who do not 
go on to further education will join the military. 
Least squares estimates of the relationship between military service 
and earnings in the civilian labor market in 1979 are presented in section 
6.2.  We  conclude that the effect  of  military  service on earnings in 
civilian jobs is similar to the effect of experience with one employer 121  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of  Youths 
on earnings with a second. Experience on a given job is much more 
related to earnings on that job than is experience in a previous job. 
Similarly, the return on a civilian job for experience in the military is 
considerably less than the return on experience in the civilian labor 
market. 
Whether military service is a good choice for those who actually 
choose it is another question. Those who join the military, for example, 
may be those who would otherwise have had unusually poor employ- 
ment experiences in the civilian labor force. That is, there may be a 
self-selection effect that we are unable to capture by this simple anal- 
ysis. While we began with the intent of  addressing through statistical 
techniques this potential self-selection problem, we have been largely 
unsuccessful. The results that we obtain are not robust to changes in 
specification and are often implausible. The difficulty is explained in 
some detail in a companion paper on the labor market effects of junior 
college and  postsecondary  vocational  school training.  We  shall not 
duplicate that explanation here. We  shall argue, however, that our least 
squares results are unlikely to exaggerate the effects of military service 
on earnings in the civilian labor market, although they may undervalue 
the importance of military service for those who choose to enlist. This 
would be the case if  those who enlist would otherwise have had un- 
usually poor employment experiences in the civilian labor market and 
thus would for that reason have relatively low wage rates in civilian 
jobs later on. 
In short, we conclude that if  a high school graduate were primarily 
motivated by earnings in the civilian job market a few years hence, he 
would, other things being equal, be best advised to find a job in the 
civilian sector. But other things may  not be equal. Many important 
reasons for choosing jobs and career paths are of course ignored in 
this analysis. The evidence in Phillips and Wise (chap. 2), for example, 
demonstrates that the average high school graduate who does not obtain 
a four-year college degree would over his lifetime earn considerably 
more following a career in the military than he would were he to pursue 
a career path in the civilian sector. 
6.1  Descriptive Data 
The academic achievements of high school graduates who enlist in 
the military are very similar to those of their peers who enter the civilian 
labor force after graduation from high school. As demonstrated in table 
6.1, a combination of mathematics and verbal test scores of these two 
groups are virtually the same. The test score variable and others whose 
means  are shown in  table 6.1 are described in  more detail in  table 
6.A.  1. We  also see that the high school class ranks of these two groups U2  Jon R. CranelDavid A. Wise 
Table 6.1  Average Attributes of Young  Men by Selected Post-Secondary- 
School Choice 
Variable 
Civilian  Junior 
Labor  College/  Four-Year 
Military"  Forceb  VocationalC  Colleged 
Weekly earnings  1979 
Hourly wage 1979 
Weeks worked  1979 
Parent's income 
Test score 
High school rank 




Father's education high 
Father's education low 
Mother's education high 
Mother's education low 
N 
261.68 



















































































































"Served in  the  military  sometime  between  1972 and  1979 and had  no postsecondary 
schooling. 
bWorked sometime between  1972 and 1979 and neither  served in the military  nor had 
any postsecondary schooling. 
=Attended a junior college  or a vocational  school between  1972 and  1979 and neither 
went to a four-year college nor served in the military. 
dWent to a four-year college sometime between  1972 and 1979 and neither served in the 
military nor attended a junior college or a vocational school. 
are very similar, 31 for military enlistees versus 34 for those who en- 
tered the civilian labor force. For comparison, we have also shown in 
table 6.1 the mean of  attributes of  high school graduates who go to 
junior colleges and vocational  schools and of those who enter four- 
year colleges. As the table makes clear, it is the four-year college group 
that differs from the others; the differences in academic achievement 123  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of Youths 
among the three groups that do not attend four-year colleges are rel- 
atively small. This observation has led us for the most part to exclude 
from our subsequent  comparisons  high  school graduates  who have 
elected to go to four-year colleges. Since those who go from high school 
to attend  a four-year college seldom enlist in the military, it  seems 
appropriate when analyzing the effect of military service on later suc- 
cess in the civilian labor market to compare military enlistees with their 
high peers who in practice were potential military enlistees, but chose 
not to enlist. 
While the academic achievement of military enlistees and those who 
enter the civilian labor force are similar, there are differences between 
the two groups in  some family background  attributes. Although ap- 
proximately  10 percent of the civilian labor force group are black, 16 
percent of military enlistees are black. The average family income of 
military enlistees is approximately $1,000 less than the average for 
entrants into the civilian labor force. The parents’ education of military 
enlistees is somewhat lower than that of those who enter the civilian 
labor force or go to junior colleges or vocational schools. But again, 
the major distinction is between the four-year college group and the 
other three. College entrants, for example, were unlikely to have par- 
ents with less than a high  school education, while approximately 50 
percent of military enlistees and junior college entrants had parents 
who had not graduated from high school. 
Finally, we observe that military enlistees earned about  11 percent 
less per week in  1979 than their peers who entered the civilian labor 
market, and they earned approximately 7 percent less per hour. The 
two groups worked virtually the same number of weeks per year in 
1979. 
The data in table 6.1 pertain to groups of high school graduates who 
essentially followed non-overlapping work and educational paths after 
graduation from high school. Of  course many young men who enlist 
in the military subsequently attend  junior colleges or vocational schools 
or go on to attend four-year colleges. Thus there is no unambiguous 
way to distinguish military enlistees from other high school graduates. 
We  have experimented with different  definitions,  finding that our 
basic conclusions do not depend significantly on the particular defini- 
tion chosen. For example, descriptive data based on the status of young 
men in October of 1973 shortly after graduation from high school, which 
includes men who went on to college later, presents essentially the 
same picture as described by the data in table 6.2.  The military enlistees 
earned approximately 11 percent less per week in 1979 than those who 
were in the civilian labor force in 1973, and again they earned approx- 
imately 7 percent less per hour. Enlistees were somewhat more likely 
to continue their education than those who entered the civilian labor 124  Jon R. CranelDavid A. Wise 
Table 6.2  Average Attributes of Young Men by 1973 Military versus Civilian 
Labor Force Status 
Variable  Military” 
Civilian 
Labor Force” 
Weekly earnings  1979 
Hourly wage  1979 
Weeks worked  1979 
Parent’s income 
Test score 
High school rank 




Father’s education high 
Father’s education low 
Mother’s education high 
Mother’s education low 








































the military in October 1973. 
the civilian labor force in October 1973. 
force after high school. For example, 58 percent of enlistees went on 
to a four-year college compared to 50 percent of non-enlistees. In short, 
our results are not sensitive to the precise sample used. In our analysis 
below, we rely primarily on comparisons between the first two groups 
as defined in table 6.1. 
The average characteristics of  high school graduates who followed 
other selected paths of work and post-secondary-school attendance are 
shown in table 6.A.2. The data in this table confirm that among high 
school graduates, the primary distinction is between those who ulti- 
mately go to four-year colleges and those who do not. In particular, 
those who enlisted in the military and then went to a four-year college 
have academic achievement attributes similar to other high school grad- 
uates who went to four-year colleges. 
We  note above that the high  school graduates who enlisted in the 
military are in  most respects similar to those who enter the civilian 
labor force. Thus we might suspect that it would be difficult to predict 
which of  these two alternatives is chosen, given that one of  them is. 
Probit estimates of the probability of enlistment in the military confirm 
this possibility. The estimates are shown in table 6.A.3.  Parents’ income 
and race are the only consistently important predictors of enlistment. 
The percentage of black youths who enlist in the military, holding other 125  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of  Youths 
attributes constant, is approximately 2.5 percentage points higher than 
the percentage among whites. Approximately  10 percent of  youths in 
our sample enlist in the military, as can be seen from the data in tables 
6.1 and 6.2. Family income also bears a statistically  significant rela- 
tionship to enlistment among high  school graduates who obtain no 
further education. A $1,000 reduction in family income is associated 
with an increase of 2.4 points in the probability of enlistment. 
6.2  Estimates of  the Effect of Military Service on Civilian Earnings 
Estimates of the effect of military service on civilian earnings are 
based on simple least squares regression. The primary results of our 
analysis are presented in table 6.3, with more detailed results shown 
in table 6.A.4. These results distinguish youth who served in the mil- 
itary between 1972 and 1979 from those who did not, excluding from 
the analysis  high  school graduates who went  to four-year colleges. 
Some of  those in the analysis sample attended vocational schools or 
junior colleges.  The regression  specification thus includes indicator 
variables  to identify those who obtained further education.  We  em- 
phasize  at the outset that our results  are not  very  sensitive to the 
particular way in which the sample is selected. 
After controlling for other attributes of high  school graduates, the 
weekly earnings on civilian jobs of  those who served in the military 
were in 1979 approximately  12 percent less than the earnings of those 
who worked only in the civilian sector. Recall that the summary data 
in table 6.1 show that the weekly earnings of the military group were 
approximately 11 percent lower than the earnings of the civilian labor 
force group. Thus, control for other individual attributes that appar- 
Table 6.3  Effects of  Military and Civilian Work  Experience on 1979 Weekly 




















Nores: Complete results are in table 6.A.4. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
1979 weekly earnings. The sample size is 2,987. 126  Jon R. Crane/David A. Wise 
ently affect civilian earnings seems to increase very slightly the dif- 
ference between the two groups. 
The explanation for this difference seems simply to be that the value 
of military experience in the civilian labor market is less than the value 
of experience on civilian jobs. This is demonstrated by the estimates 
presented in column (2) of table 6.3. A year (fifty-two weeks) of civilian 
work experience is associated with an increase of about 7 percent in 
1979 earnings. In contrast, a year of military experience is associated 
with only a 3 percent  increase in  earnings in  the civilian sector. In 
addition, the estimates suggest that the return on civilian experience 
for persons who served in the military was slightly lower than the return 
on civilian experience for those who had no military experience. The 
relevant estimate is 5.9 percent versus 7 percent for those whose ex- 
perience was entirely in the civilian sector, although the two estimates 
are not  significantly different  by  standard  statistical criteria.  When 
experience in the civilian and military  sectors is controlled for, the 
estimated coefficient on the simple indicator variable of military service 
is not significantly different from zero. 
Thus, we conclude that the relationship between the return on mil- 
itary  experience in  the  civilian  sector is  similar to the relationship 
between the return on experience in the job that one holds in the civilian 
sector versus the return on that job to experience in a prior job in the 
civilian sector. Typically, the return on more experience in the job that 
one holds is substantially greater than the return on experience in a 
prior job. Or, more experience with one’s current employer is typically 
worth more than experience with another previous employer. This is 
not  to say that  military experience is worth less than civilian labor 
market experience. It simply says that staying with the same employer 
is typically better than switching from one job to the other. Evidence 
collected by Phillips and Wise (chap. 2, this volume) indicates that the 
typical high school graduate choosing the military as a career would 
earn substantially more over his lifetime than the typical high school 
graduate following a career in the civilian sector. 
Still the data suggest that if  one wanted to follow a career in the 
civilian labor market and if one’s goal were to maximize civilian earn- 
ings, then other things being equal it would be better to obtain a civilian 
job after graduation from high school. Of course, other things may not 
be equal. Youths who enlist in the military may  not  have the same 
civilian job opportunities after graduation  from high school as those 
who take these jobs. That is, there may be self-selection effects. We 
observe, for example, that black youths are more likely to enter the 
military than nonblack youths. It is common knowledge by now that 
the civilian unemployment rate of black youths is very much higher 
than the unemployment rate for nonblack youths. And, it is important 127  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of Youths 
to remember that school and work choices after graduation from high 
school surely depend on many goals other than earnings. 
Finally, the more detailed results in table 6.A.4  show that even seven 
years after graduation from high school, parents’ income bears a sig- 
nificant relationship to earnings of these youths, with a $1,000 increase 
in parents’ income associated with approximately a 1 percent increase 
in weekly earnings. Consistent with the evidence from Meyer and Wise 
(1982), youths who held jobs in high school earn more than those who 
did not. Those with dependents earn more than those without these 
family responsibilities. Black youths earn approximately 5 percent less 
than nonblack youths. 
Some young women, of course, also served in the military, but the 
numbers were not large enough to obtain separate estimates for women. 
We did, however, obtain estimates for men and women combined. The 
primary results are shown in table 6.4, with more detailed estimates 
reported in table 6.A.5. The results are similar to those obtained for 
men alone. 
Finally, we obtained separate estimates for black men and nonblack 
men. The major results are shown in table 6.5, with more detail pre- 
sented in table 6.A.6. Because of the small sample size, the standard 
errors of the estimates for blacks are considerably larger than those 
for nonblacks. But the basic message is the same. The estimates show 
that the 1979 earnings of nonblack youths who served in the military 
were  11 percent lower than the earnings of those whose experience 
was only in the civilian sector, while black youths who served in the 
military earned  16  percent less than  their  peers  who  stayed  in  the 
civilian sector. Parameter estimates on military versus civilian expe- 
rience again demonstrate that the return on civilian experience in ci- 
Table 6.4  Effects of Military and Civilian Work  Experience on 1W9 Weekly 
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Table 6.5  Effects of Military and Civilian Work  Experience on 1979 Weekly 







-.111  .038 
(.030)  (.163) 
-  ,060 
(.030) 
-  ,031 
(0.26) 
-  ,070 
experience of nonenlistees  (.008) 
-.158  ,107 
i.088)  (.318) 
-  ,059 
i  ,064) 
-  ,010 
(.056) 
-  ,084 
(.026) 
Notes: Complete  results are in table 6.A.6. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
1979 weekly earnings. The sample sizes are 2,635 for nonblacks and 352 for blacks. 
vilian jobs is greater than the return on military experience in civilian 
jobs. Again, we find that the return on civilian experience of those who 
served  in the military  is  somewhat less than the return  on  civilian 
experience for those who remained in the civilian sector. For nonblacks, 
however, the two coefficients are close, 7.0 versus 6.0, and not statis- 
tically different from one another. The coefficient on the civilian ex- 
perience of black enlistees is considerably lower than the coefficient 
on civilian experience of  black  youths who remained  in the civilian 
sector, but the military coefficient for the enlistees is measured impre- 
cisely, so again the two are not significantly different. Indeed, it is clear 
from the coefficients and their standard errors that the coefficients for 
the two groups are not as a group statistically different from one another. 
While we have been unable to make rigorous corrections for possible 
self-selection impacts on our estimates, contrasts between two partic- 
ular groups of  youths suggest the direction  that the selection effect 
might take.  Suppose, for example, that  youths who enlisted in  the 
military would have been unemployed otherwise. Having in mind this 
possibility, we selected youths who in October 1973 and October 1974 
were either in the military or were not employed and not in  school. 
Then we estimated the relationship between military experience and 
civilian experience on the one hand and the 1979 weekly earnings of 
this group. It is clear, of course, that this selection procedure arbitrarily 
picks out youths who would be expected to have relatively unsuccessful 
labor market experiences in the civilian sector. This must be true be- 
cause we would expect that youths who were not employed in  1973 
and  1974 were disproportionately those with poor employment pros- 
pects. Nonetheless, this artificial experiment may be informative. 
The results  are shown in  table 6.6, with  more  detailed evidence 
presented in table 6.A.7.  We  see that when these two groups are com- 129  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of Youths 
Table 6.6  Effects of Military and Civilian Work  Experience on 1979 Weekly 
Earnings of Men Who Were Either in the Military or Not 
Employed and Not in School in 1973-74 
Variable 
Specification 




of  enlistees 
Civilian work 
experience of  nonenlistees 











Notes:  In the military in October 1973 or October  1974, or not employed and not in 
school in 1973 and 1974. Complete results are in table 6.A.7. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of  1979 weekly earnings. The sample size is 142. 
pared, those who served in the military had a substantial advantage in 
civilian earnings over those who were not  employed. For example, 
suppose that the group that was not employed during the first two years 
after graduation from high school then worked continuously for five 
years in the civilian labor market. According to the estimates in table 
6.6, this work experience would have led to a 72 percent increase in 
their earnings. In contrast, if the military group served for three years 
in that capacity and then worked continuously for four years in the 
civilian sector, their earnings would have increased 83 percent relative 
to individuals with no work experience over this period. This example 
is of  course artificial and surely tends to exaggerate the point, but it 
does at the same time emphasize that military service is likely to be a 
good choice for high school graduates who otherwise would be without 
work and not in school. 
6.3  Conclusions 
Among potential military enlistees, those who in fact join the military 
service are by standard test measures of quality very similar to those 
who elect not to join the service. The two groups have similar academic 
test  scores, and they performed  at approximately the  same level in 
their  high school classes.  Both groups, however, are different from 
those high school graduates who elect to go on to four-year colleges. 
But those who obtained four-year college degrees typically do not then 
enlist in the military. Thus it seems appropriate when comparing mil- 
itary enlistees with those who do not enlist to make the comparison 
with other high school graduates who might potentially  be in the en- 
listment group. This comparison suggests a picture that is at variance 130  Jon R. CraneJDavid A. Wise 
with comparisons that are sometimes made in the popular press. Our 
findings suggest that among individuals with high school degrees and 
no further education, those who enter the military are very similar to 
those who elect civilian occupations after graduation from high school. 
They are not a substandard group. 
We  also find that to obtain wage increases in the civilian sector, job 
experience in the civilian labor market is worth more than job expe- 
rience in the military. Apparently  the occupational training and job 
experience received in the military is not  as valuable in the private 
sector as job training and experience in the civilian sector. It is im- 
portant to emphasize that this does not mean that earnings in the mil- 
itary sector are lower than those in the private sector. Indeed, as shown 
in  Phillips and Wise (chap.  2), high school graduates who choose a 
military career should expect to earn over their lifetimes substantially 
more  than  high  school graduates  who follow a civilian career. The 
results also do not mean that military enlistment is a poor choice for 
those who make it, even if they intend ultimately to follow a career in 
the civilian sector. Those who in fact chose to enlist may have been 
disproportionately those who faced poor employment experiences in 
the private sector upon graduation from high school. In more formal 
terms, there may have been  self-selection.  Unobserved factors, that 
is, factors we have not been able to control for in the analysis, may 
have made enlistment a particularly good choice for those who made 
it. We  have not been able in practice to correct satisfactorily for this 
potential effect in a formal statistical manner. 
Appendix 
Table 6.A.1  Variable Definitions 
~~ 
Variable  Definition 
Weekly earnings 1979 
Hourly wage 1979 






Earnings per week in 1979. 
Earnings per week divided by hours worked per week in 
1979. 
Number of weeks worked in 1979. 
Weeks worked between 1972 and 1979 by nonenlistees 
divided by 52. 
Weeks spent in the military between  1972 and 1979 
divided by 52. 
Weeks worked (divided by 52) between 1972 and 1979 in 
the civilian labor force by youth who also were in the 
military. 
The midpoint of  the interval reported in the survey. 
Those in the $18,000+ interval were assigned the value 
20.000. 131  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of Youths 
Table 6.A.1  (continued) 
Variable  Definition 
Test score 
High school rank 


















State wage  1972 
Missing state wage 
Parent’s income 
Test score missing 




The sum of a score on a mathematics test, plus one-half 
the sum of scores on a reading test and a vocabulary test. 
Percentile class rank in high school. 
Coded 1 if  the individual worked during high school and 
0 otherwise. 
Coded  1 if the individual lived in the metropolitan area 
of a city of more than 100,OOO  in 1979 and 0 otherwise. 
Coded 1 if  the individual lived in the metropolitan  area 
of a city of  more than 100,OOO  in 1972, and 0 otherwise. 
Coded  1 if  the individual was black and 0 otherwise. 
Coded  1 if the individual was male and 0 if female. 
Coded  1  if the individual’s father graduated from 
college and 0 otherwise. 
Coded 1 if the individual’s father did not graduate from 
high school and 0 otherwise. 
Coded 1 is the individual’s mother graduated from 
college and 0 otherwise 
Coded  1 if the individual’s mother did not graduate from 
high school and 0 otherwise. 
The number of people an individual listed as being 
financially dependent on him in 1979. 
Coded  1 if the individual served in the military and 0 
otherwise. 
Coded 1 if the individual went to college and 0 otherwise. 
Coded 1 if the individual went to a junior college or a 
postsecondary vocational school and 0 otherwise. 
The average weekly wage of manufacturing workers in 
the individual’s state in  1972. If the figure was missing 
it was coded as the national average. 
Coded 1 if the average manufacturing wage in 1972 in the 
individual’s state was missing and 0 otherwise. 
Coded 1 if the value for the parents’ income variable 
was missing and 0 otherwise. 
Coded  1  if the value for the test score variable was 
missing and 0 otherwise. 
Coded  1 if  the value for the high school job variable 
was missing and 0 otherwise. 132  Jon R. Crane/David A. Wise 





Weeks worked 1979 
Parents’ income 
Test score 
High school rank 




Father’s education high 
Father’s education low 
Mother’s education high 
Mother’s education low 




Col. or Voc.  Jr. Col. or 
Military &  School &  Military &  Voc. School 
Jr. Col. or  4-Year  4-Year  and 4-Year 









(3927.8  1) 
93.25 
(  17.06) 
26.65 

















































































































Table 6.A.3  Military Service in 1973, Probit Model Parameter Estimates 
Parameter  Standard  Simulated 
Variable  Estimate  Error  Derivative 
Constant  -  ,878  .207  - 
Parents’ income  -  ,019  .0044  -  ,024 
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Table 6.A.3  (continued) 
Parameter  Standard  Simulated 
Variable  Estimate  Error  Derivative 
Test score  .0022  ,0015  .003 
(10  PtS) 
High school rank  -  .0036  .0008  -  ,004 
(10 percentile pts.) 
High school job  .031  .047  .003 
Urban 1972  -  .062  .044  -  ,007 
Black  ,229  .062  ,025 
Father’s education high  -.197  .619  -  .002 
Father’s education low  .150  ,460  ,002 
Mother’s education high  -  .897  .718  -  ,010 
Mother’s education low  .441  .474  .005 
State wage 1972  .0013  .0089  -  ,001 
($lO/wk.) 
Parents’ income missing  -  .316  .731  -  .035 
Test score missing  .lo6  .153  ,012 
High school job missing  .679  ,150  .007 
State wage  1972 missing  .500  ,469  ,006 
Notes: The results pertain to men who did not go on for postsecondary education between 
1972 and 1979. The simulated derivative is given with respect to the change in parenthesis. 
If no change is specified, the variable is a categorical dummy and the change is from 0 
to 1. Each derivative is evaluated at the mean of the other variables. 
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Test score 
High school rank 
High school job 
Urban 1979 
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Table 6.A.4  (continued) 
Specification 
Black  -  ,191  -  ,160 
(.029)  (.029) 
Dependents  ,049  ,040 
(.007)  (  ,007) 
(.039)  (.038) 
Father’s education low  -  .014  -  ,016 
(0.20)  (.020) 
Mother’s education high  -  ,054  -  ,042 
(.042)  (.042) 
Mother’s education low  -  ,026  -  ,023 
(.020)  (.020) 
Two-year college and vocational  -  .020  -  ,014 
(.028)  (.027) 
(.032)  (.031) 
Test score missing  ,057  .041 
(.069)  (.068) 
High school job missing  .I15  ,103 
(.065)  (.OM) 
R*  .07  .10 
N  2987  2987 
Father’s education high  -  .075  -  ,042 
Parents’ income missing  .015  -  .154 
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Father’s education high 
Father’s education low 
Mother’s education high 
Mother’s education low 
Two-year college and vocational 
Parents’ income missing 
Test score missing 














-  ,058 
(.015) 










-  ,036 
-.011 










(.027  j 
-  ,011 
(.015) 
-  .024 
(.033) 












Table 6.A.6  Parameter Estimates, 1979 Weekly Earnings of Men, by Race 
Nonblack  Black 






Military experience  - 
Civilian work experience  - 
Parents’ income  + 1,000  .015 
(.002) 
Test score  .oO05 
(.0008) 
-  ,038  -.158 
(. 163)  (.088) 
,070  - 
(.OW 
,031  - 
(.026) 
.060  - 
(.030) 
.015  .00007 
(.002)  (.008) 
.0004  .002 
(.0007)  (.003) 
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Table 6.A.6  (continued) 
Variable 
High school rank 
High school job 
Urban 1979 
Dependents 
Father’s education high 
Father’s education low 
Mother’s education high 
Mother’s education low 
Two-year college and vocational 
Parents’ income missing 
Test score missing 




.OOO6  .0006 
(.0004)  (.0004) 
,086  ,060 
(.024)  (  ,024) 
,062  ,062 
(.021)  (.021) 
.046  .037 
(.007)  (.007) 
-  .083  -  ,054 
(.038)  (.038) 
~  ,016  -  .018 
(.020)  (.020) 
-  .068  -  ,052 
(.  043)  (.042) 
(.021)  (.021) 
-  ,013  -  .009 
(.028)  (.028) 
,168  ,178 
(.033)  (.033) 
.060  .043 
(.072)  (.071) 
.053  ,032 
(.072)  (.071) 
.06  .08 
2635  2635 
-  ,028  ~  ,024 
.o004  .0009 
(.0014)  (.0014) 
(  ,069)  (.070) 
,012  .109 
(.070)  (.069) 
.065  ,057 
(.023)  (.023) 
,100  .265 
(.312)  (.313) 
-  .008  -.011 
(.074)  (.073) 
,097  .074 
(  .206)  (.205) 
(.073)  (.072) 
-  ,074  -  ,047 
(.loo)  (.loo) 
.040  .007 
(.101)  (. 101) 
.I36  ,072 
(.277)  (.275) 
,336  .352 
(.170)  (.168) 
.06  .09 
352  352 
-  ,031  -  ,076 
-  .015  -  .019 
Table 6.A.7  Parameter Estimates, 1979 Weekly Earnings of Men, Sample of 






Military in 1973 or 1974 
Work experience 
Military experience 
Civilian work experience 
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Table 6.A.7  (continued) 
Variable 
Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error 
High school rank 




Father’s education high 
Father’s education low 
Mother’s education high 
Mother’s education low 
Two-year college and vocational 
Parents’ income missing 
Test score missing 
High school job missing 
R2 
N 












-  .013 
(.133) 










-  ,048 
-.I17 
-  .I67 















-  .034 
(.128) 










-  .097 
-  .124 
Notes: The sample contains persons who were in the military in October 1973 or October 
1974, or not employed and not in school in  1973 and 1974. The dependent variable is 
the logarithm of weekly earnings. 
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Comment  D. Alton Smith 
The comparability of military and civilian compensation has long been 
a major issue in the economics of national defense. It became even 
more important when the armed services turned toward market forces, 
and away from the draft, as the mechanism for filling the enlisted ranks. 
While most attention has focused on relative pay and fringe benefits, 
there has been an increasing interest in analyzing how military service 
affects  the postservice civilian  earnings  of  veterans. For  example, 
knowledge about these effects is an important ingredient in designing 
an efficient military retirement program.  But the vast majority of en- 
listed personnel do not stay in the military until retirement; they leave 
after their first enlistment term. How, then, do the job training, work 
experience, and credentials supplied by the services affect the civilian 
earnings of these individuals? Or, in  the words of an enlistment ad- 
vertising campaign, are the armed forces really “a great place to start” 
as far as future earnings are concerned? 
Chapter 6 by Crane and Wise  provides  some of  the first  reliable 
answers to this question. Using the National Longitudinal Study of the 
Class of 1972, they estimate an earnings function, for earnings in 1979, 
that includes a dichotomous variable indicating past military  service. 
The model is estimated with a sample that includes high school grad- 
uates who did not pursue postsecondary education, so their results are 
applicable to between 70 percent and 90 percent of the first-term en- 
listed force in the 1980s. 
Crane and Wise find that male veterans, on average, have weekly 
earnings that are 12 percent less than otherwise comparable civilians. 
They then relate this differential to different kinds of work experience 
by adding years of military service and years of civilian work experi- 
ence, separately for veterans and nonveterans, into the model. These 
estimates provide the two most interesting findings in the chapter. First, 
the authors find that, for veterans, a year of military experience has 
about half the impact on civilian earnings as a year of civilian work 
experience. And  second, that the civilian experience of veterans has 
a smaller impact on civilian earnings than the civilian experience of 
those who never  served in  the armed forces. The difference  here, 
however, is small and not significantly different from zero. 
The first result has also been reported in  studies of the effects of 
military service on the earnings of retirees (see Goldberg and Warner 
1984, for example). As Crane and Wise note, this result is consistent 
with the finding that, in the civilian sector, current earnings are affected 
more by  experience on the current job than experience in  previous 
jobs. In addition,  the difference between the returns to civilian and 
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military work experience reflects the fact that some military occupa- 
tions, such as combat-related jobs, have no counterpart in the civilian 
sector. Even the benefits from transferable skills are attenuated by the 
occupation switching that often occurs when an enlisted person leaves 
the service. For example, one survey found that less than 20 percent 
of Navy enlisted personnel who were trained in an electronics-related 
job stayed in the same field after leaving the Navy. 
The second finding, that civilian experience is less valuable for vet- 
erans, is more subject to measurement error because of the comparison 
made between those who did and did not enlist. There is self-selection 
in the decision to enlist, and that can introduce unmeasurable differ- 
ences between veterans and civilians, biasing the estimated effect on 
earnings. Crane and Wise recognize this problem and attempt to correct 
for it  by  estimating  an  enlistment function along with  the  earnings 
equation. They find almost no difference between the observed char- 
acteristics of  those who did and did not enlist  and, therefore, have 
difficulty independently ‘‘explaining” the enlistment decision in the 
joint model. This result is surprising given the usually strong relation- 
ship in cross-section time series models of enlistment behavior between 
enlistments of above-average high school graduates and unemployment 
and relative military pay, among other variables. 
The authors note that ignoring self-selection will bias the effect of 
military experience downward because those individuals with less at- 
tractive opportunities in the civilian sector will be more likely to enlist. 
But a second self-selection occurs at the reenlistment decision (see 
Baldwin and Daula  1985), and only individuals who left the armed 
forces by  1979 were included in  the analysis. This selection process 
will have the opposite bias because it is the individuals with superior 
prospects in the civilian labor market who, other things being equal, 
leave the service. With conflicting sources of bias, we cannot predict 
how ignoring self-selection will affect the estimated coefficients. 
The question of who decides to enlist also points to a possible mis- 
specification of the earnings equation. The enlistment literature (Brown 
1985; Daula and Smith  1985; among others) tells us that individuals 
from areas with high unemployment and lower civilian wages are more 
likely to enlist. If a substantial proportion of the individuals separating 
from the military return to their preservice homes, as seems likely after 
only two to four years of military service, the military variables in the 
earnings equation will pick up this geographic effect on civilian earn- 
ings, biasing the estimated coefficients downward. This result could be 
avoided by including area unemployment and earnings variables in the 
earnings equation. 
In terms of future civilian earnings, then, are the armed forces “a 
great place to start”? The answer, as noted by the authors, depends 
on an individual’s alternatives. On average, military work experience 140  Jon R. CraneDavid A. Wise 
has less of an impact on civilian earnings than civilian work experience, 
but military experience is better than no experience at all in boosting 
future earnings. Therefore, military service is particularly attractive to 
those high school graduates who, because of weak local labor markets 
or other factors, face lower employment and earnings opportunities in 
the civilian sector. The military can offer an increase in current earnings 
and work experience that is valuable in postservice employment. 
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Comment  Charles Brown 
Previous research on military enlistments has been based, more or less 
explicity, on the supply behavior of enlistees. Of course, it usually was 
recognized that the number of enlistments by those lacking the pre- 
ferred credentials might be demand constrained; the usual response by 
researchers was to ignore the flow into military service of those with 
low  test  scores or those who had  not  graduated from  high  school. 
Understanding the flow of “marginal” enlistees is essential for under- 
standing the impact of the military on youth labor markets. Chapter 4, 
by Ellwood and Wise, presents a simple extension of earlier work which 
gives a much clearer picture of the way in which economic conditions 
affect enlistment of different youth groups. 
One important implication of the fact that the ability of less-preferred 
groups to enlist depends on the supply of more-preferred groups is that 
the “representativeness” of the all-volunteer force depends on the size 
of that force and the level of compensation offered to enlistees. Given 
the total number of  recruits, for example, as military pay rises, the 
fraction of  enlistees from preferred groups (whose “underrepresenta- 
tion” has led to criticism of the all-volunteer force) will increase. 
Charles Brown is professor of economics at the University of Michigan and a research 
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The two key assumptions of Ellwood and Wise’s chapter 4 are that 
FRACT, the fraction of those who desire to enlist, depends on aggregate 
but  not  local conditions, and that total enlistments are exogenously 
determined. The first assumption is probably a defensible first approx- 
imation, though it is unlikely to be exactly correct. If local recruitment 
targets are not quickly adjusted to local conditions, local conditions 
may affect FRACT; the likely impact, as Ellwood and Wise recognize, 
is that effects of local conditions on supply will  be  understated  for 
groups facing some demand constraints. A description of how recruiting 
standards are determined would be helpful. If the process is sufficiently 
mechanical, one might even be able to use this information to constrain 
some of the coefficients in the FRACT equation. 
Total enlistments are not likely to be  strictly exogenous since the 
armed services sometimes fail to obtain the desired number of enlistees. 
(For example, in FY 1979 they were 7 percent  short of their target 
[Hale and Slackman 1980, 31).  Using the targets instead of the actual 
number of enlistments would be preferable. A simple way of checking 
the supply coefficients is to let year dummies stand for all of the relevant 
national demand-side variables  (including some, such as educational 
benefits or national advertising activity, that are now omitted). 
The results presented by Ellwood and Wise are generally sensible, 
and the exceptions are fairly noted, I was less comfortable than the 
authors with two of the results. First, while total enlistments matter 
less for high-scoring youth than for others, I still am surprised that 
they are so large (an elasticity of about 0.5). Second, I am not com- 
fortable with the idea that the positive effect of national unemployment 
on local enlistments by high school graduates and high-scoring youths 
reflects these youths responding to national employment alternatives 
in deciding whether to enlist. Such behavior  is plausible for college 
graduates,  but  the  enlistment  decision  here  is being made  by  non- 
college-bound portions of those two groups. 
Because the equations are estimated with state-specific fixed effects, 
determinants of military enlistments which do not change within a state 
over time are already accounted for. Two enlistment determinants that 
might have been included are a minimum wage variable and the youth 
population share. The real minimum wage fluctuated during the period, 
as the nominal minimum was increased in  1974-75  and 1978-81,  but 
prices and other wages increased more smoothly. Even assuming a 10 
percent increase in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment 
by  1 percent (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982) would lead to nontrivial 
fluctuations in civilian youth employment prospects. The youth pop- 
ulation share could also be justified on the grounds that, at given levels 
of  adult unemployment and wage, youth employment prospects and/ 
or wages are lower where their share of population is highest. In chap- 142  Jon  R. CraneIDavid A. Wise 
ter  5,  however, Ellwood and Wise find little effect of youth population 
share on youth employment. 
One other possible extension of the reported equations would be to 
impose the cross-equation constraints implied by the assumption that 
total recruitment is exogenous. Thus, an increase everywhere in civilian 
wages or unemployment or military pay must leave overall enlistments 
unaffected. For example, 
dEnlistments 16-19  dEnlistments 2&24  +  = 0. 
dPA Y  dPA Y 
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where s is the share of 16-to-24-year-old enlistees who are aged 16 to 
19; since s varies over time, no restrictions of the coefficients (i.e., of 
the derivatives) can make the constraint hold exactly in all years. Still, 
given the difficulty of  getting  sensible  estimates for military pay,  a 
slightly incorrect constraint may be better than free estimation. 
Ellwood and Wise make a strong case in the introduction to chapter 
5 for the importance of the military as an employer of youths-partic- 
ularly black youths. Moreover, the relative importance of the military 
appears  destined  to  increase  as  relatively  small  cohorts  enter the 
enlistment-prone age range. 
The main theme of Ellwood and Wise’s results is that military hiring 
seems to have a small negative effect on white civilian youth employ- 
ment and almost no effect for blacks.’ My initial reaction was skepti- 
cism-youth  labor supply is not likely to be perfectly elastic, and in- 
stitutional rigidities such as the minimum wage (which create an excess 
supply from which the military could draw without affecting civilian 
employment) seem more likely to characterize the market for the youths 
the military does not accept than for the youths it does hire. On re- 
flection,  Ellwood  and  Wise’s scenario may  be  reasonable  after  all. 
While  the  “typical”  recruit  is a high  school graduate  with  decent 
achievement-test scores, the marginal recruit may be far more likely 
to  be  a  low-scoring,  disadvantaged  graduate  or  moderate-scoring 
dropout. 
In any case, it is not clear exactly how Ellwood and Wise would 
explain their results-elastic  supply, nonclearing markets, or some more 
complicated alternative.  Neither elastic  supply of  black  youths  nor 
failure of  markets to clear lead one to expect the negligible effect of 
higher white military enlistments (which, like a low adult unemploy- 143  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of Youths 
ment rate, presumably mean more demand for black youths by civilian 
employees) on black civilian employment. Some complementary evi- 
dence might be gotten by estimating similarly structured reduced form 
wage equations (using, for example, NLS72 data). 
Perhaps one should place less emphasis on the point estimates than 
Ellwood and Wise do. The reported two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
coefficient for whites in table 6.A.1 (- .290, s.e.  = .279) means that a 
95 percent confidence interval runs from -  .85 to +  .28-or  virtually 
the entire 0 to -  1 range one might accept as reasonable on a priori 
grounds. (The white and nonwhite TSLS coefficients may not even be 
statistically different at usual significance levels.) 
As Ellwood and Wise recognize, TSLS estimation is needed because 
military enlistments not only  depend on youth  civilian employment 
prospects but (possibly) change them. I am a bit puzzled by the two- 
stage procedure they use. Using lagged (local) military employment in 
constructing the instrument for the current military-to-population ratio 
leaves the instrument still correlated with the error term in  equation 
(31, if  that error term is serially correlated. It was not clear (in the 
conference version) under what conditions adding a lagged dependent 
variable will solve this problem, and whether (as is usually the case) 
adding the lagged dependent variable changes the interpretation of the 
remaining coefficients. 
Crane and Wise’s study (chap. 6)  of the effect of military service 
on civilian earnings is based on the experience of the high school class 
of 1972. Unlike civilian training programs such as MDTA and CETA, 
where the training program is abolished before its impact on earnings 
can be ascertained, the all-volunteer military has been maintained for 
long enough that the experience of its earliest cohorts can be studied 
while that experience is still relevant. The NLS72 data provide such 
an opportunity and also include control variables unavailable in com- 
peting  files, such as the Current  Population  Survey  or the census. 
Since recruitment ads characterize the military as “a great place to 
start,”  it is of more than academic interest to know how good a start 
it provides. 
Crane and Wise’s answer is: about as good  a  start as a civilian 
employer one did not remain  with  would offer. Military experience 
raises earnings, but  less than civilian experience does, a difference 
Crane  and  Wise  attribute  to  the  fact  that  military  experience  is 
experience  with  a  former  employer,  while  civilian  experience  in- 
cludes  a  mixture  of  civilian  experience  and  current  tenure.  Mea- 
suring  current  tenure  directly  allows  a  more  direct  test  of  their 
explanation. 
Any conclusion about the effect of military service on civilian earn- 
ings,  as the authors freely acknowledge, must  be tempered  by  the 144  Jon  R.  Crane/David A. Wise 
possibility that military service is related to unmeasured attributes that 
directly affect civilian earnings. Crane and Wise are unable to correct 
for this selectivity, largely because the observable characteristics  of 
those who served in the military are very similar to those who entered 
the civilian labor force after high school. 
The Ellwood-Wise chapter 4 provides a reason why this might be 
the case. The pool of potential  enlistees is doubly censored-by  the 
members of that pool who choose not to enlist, and by the armed forces’ 
screening and selection procedure. One might expect that those with 
the best  civilian prospects  would be reluctant to enlist, while those 
with low test  scores, serious physical  handicaps,  or police  records 
would be unable to enlist. If  “ability”  were unidimensional,  I would 
expect the most and least able to be underrepresented  among those 
who serve in the military. The direction of the bias in Crane and Wise’s 
estimates of military experience effects would be uncertain,  and its 
magnitude might not be large. 
Since the military and civilian sectors do not reward exactly the same 
things, and because other factors enter the decision, it might be feasible 
to correct for this double-edged selection. The probability of wanting 
to enlist would depend on civilian alternatives (including local unem- 
ployment rates and test score determinants), attitudes toward military 
service, and the intensity of military recruiting. The probability of being 
acceptable to the armed forces would depend on test scores (and pre- 
dicters of  test scores, such as parental education), health conditions 
that would preclude enlistment, and local recruiting standards (if they 
do, in fact, vary geographically). With neither civilian alternatives nor 
military test scores observable, one does not get a perfect partition of 
the independent variables  in these two selection equations, but  one 
might have enough variables appearing in only one equation to make 
progress. Several of the factors I have mentioned (early 1970s economic 
conditions, recruitment  efforts,  recruiting  standards, and, arguably, 
attitudes toward the military) would not belong in the equation for the 
1979 wage rate, so one might have some real leverage for a sample- 
selection correction. Even if one decides that a twice-censored model 
is unfeasible, a single probit selection could be bolstered by including 
some of these variables. 
Notes 
1. Like Ellwood and Wise, I am inclined to focus on employment-to-population 
ratios rather than unemployment rates. But it would still be of interest to know 
to  what extent military employment changes the number of  youths who are 
unemployed. 145  Military Service and Civilian Earnings of Youths 
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